India had to have powerful
transmitters to counter Chinese propaganda during the 1962 aggression. The
I&B Minister okayed an agreement with VOA which led to the government
coming under domestic fire. The I&B Secy became the Bakra.
By S Narendra
Former Adviser to PMs and Govt of
India Spokesperson
(Political
communication is the oxygen of an open democracy like India. Its role and
complexion changes when a nation confronts an external threat. PC becomes a
‘aapath dharma shastra’ or weapon for survival by rallying the people behind
the flag. But PC as propaganda has its downside as well since it tries to
steamroll dissent, the essence of democracy. Also, peace negotiations after the
armed conflict becomes difficult)
As mentioned in the previous posts,
the 1962 Chinese attack was a chastening experience for Indians and its
government. It made the government revisit many areas. One of them was the propaganda
policy and organisation for, and its structure, people and channels. The WW II
propaganda machinery such as AIR and its monitoring units in Simla that were
listening to external radio broadcasts and providing inputs to intelligence
wings, PIB, Armed forces Information Office, film documentary wing, and the new five year plan publicity wing and
advertising wing over -night became critical assets in the wake of Chinese
aggression.
The Chinese armed assault on India had been preceded by propaganda aggression for several years
before, especially targeting people living
in the Himalayan border areas. The government had not thus far given any
attention to propaganda coming from across the borders both from the west and
the east. Even within India various foreign embassies were distributing vast
quantities of propaganda material.
As a student, I had the personal
experience of a government funded Kannada journal publishing my article that
was a translation from an English magazine that I came to know later in life
was a channel for anti-communist western propaganda. Some of my journalist
friends who were recipients of foreign propaganda material would translate such
material and get them published in their newspapers. They were paid handsomely
for their efforts by concerned the foreign embassy. The academia was influenced
by supplying them with slanted articles by home country academia. Among the
latter, there was an unstated bias against the west, particularly US seen as an
ally of Pakistan, mostly induced by political communication.
After declaring national emergency,
the government hastily put together an emergency media cell in the government
for churning out official propaganda material for use by media. However, the
officials working in this unit did not have China -related information
resources for their work and they had to depend upon the US information
service. This emergency cell soon became a patron of private feature services
agencies which expected to remain credible but regularly turn out material
plugging the Indian (government) view point vis a vis adversaries. Such
agencies were paid on the basis of their subscriber base and impact.
During the Mrs Gandhi’s personal
emergency in 1975, such feature agencies pro-actively worked for the
government.
Another valuable source the emergency
cell could access was the AIR’s foreign broadcast monitoring service, a relic
of WW II. Located in Simla, this unit monitored world-wide broadcasts on a 24
hour basis and mainly serviced the intelligence community as well as AIR news
wing. Overnight, its importance was recognised and it was given more resources.
Another wing that assumed importance was the external broadcasts of AIR. While
the number of foreign language broadcasts could be increased, reaching them to
intended audience was a serious problem. And there by hangs a bizarre tale.
I&B Secretary Fired: The Chinese
were beaming broadcasts in Hindi and other Indian languages including in
north-east dialects from very powerful transmitters. Suddenly, it was realised
that AIR had not been equipped with powerful transmitters even for its
domestic, leave alone external, broadcasts for countering China.
 |
| The Author |
When the the news of the deal became public, the deal
met with severe criticism on the ground that such an arrangement could open
Indians to American (capitalist and
anti-communist) propaganda. Not only the deal was cancelled but the secretary,
P.M. Laud was forced to quit the
government to save the government’s face.
Laud later went on to become an editor
of the Financial Express.
(Next: War By Other Means..Lessons
Learnt from 1962-65 wars)
