By S. Narendra*
The Indian summer season from
April to August is always marked by shortages ranging from water and power
supply to essential items. Only thing in plentiful supply in such harsh months
is heat and sweat. It was no different in the summer of 1998 that had ushered
in the BJP - led national democratic alliance (NDA) government at the centre.
The political uncertainties following the fall of two Congress party supported
governments had also affected the general economic situation. The new
government was very much preoccupied with the country’s diplomatic isolation
following the nuclear explosion at Pokharn in May.
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| Narendra - The author is a former Spokesperson, Govt.of India & information adviser to PM) |
Around the month of June, media
was reporting sudden shortages of edible oil in some areas; sugar prices were
inching up, along with those of vegetables as well. Taking note of such media
reports, I met the then finance minister who heads the cabinet committee on
prices and requested him to hold an early meeting of this committee and review
the situation and announce measures to deal with shortages and the price rise.
Eco-system of Prices and PR: The cabinet committee on prices has as its
members the ministers in charge of Food, Agriculture, Civil Supplies and Commerce.
Some other ministers are co-opted as and when required. After reviewing the
supply position of essential commodities like edible oil, pulses, wheat, rice, sugar
and coarse grains like ragi, bajra and jowar,
the committee decided on improving the supply either by increasing the
release of any of the commodities available in government agencies like the Food Corporation
of India or through import.
Generally, import of agri-commodities
is beset with difficulties because the domestic suppliers oppose it as imports
tend to depress prices. The trader lobbies are also not very supportive of
imports as they depress prices and profits. Another factor complicating the
import option is that supplies may not be available readily. Since it is a spot
purchase, unlike a forward deal, the prices tend to be high. Parties in the
opposition become another pressure group against imports, and always ready to
allege lack of transparency and underhand dealings in imports. The farmers and
supplier lobbies of different countries are another factor to deal with. They
also use the political and media channels for scuttling each other’s chances.
They also freely make use of the brigade of allegation makers. It is not
unusual for different departments to take opposing stands for protecting their
turfs. For example, the agriculture ministry would like to project itself as
the friend of the farmer and would argue that the import price should not
exceed the minimum support price that had been offered to the Indian farmers.
Some of the states, which grow large quantities of a particular commodity such
as wheat, also jump into the fray for protecting their farmer’s interests.
In any information management,
preemption is important. Once the price rise panic button is pushed, it feeds
on rumour and there could be a run on supplies. Traders tend to hoard, creating
further shortages. The convening of the cabinet committee meeting itself could
send a signal that there would be a quick government response. In some
situations, it could raise unnecessary expectations. Therefore, it is very
essential to ensure that the meeting deliberations are carefully released to
the media. Serious divergence in the views of the members needs to be briefed
openly rather than allowing selective leaks. From a policy management
perspective, it is management of politics of shortage and relevant information
in public space.
Onion Tears: Back to the summer of 1998. The situation was
complicated by the fact that several states in the north, including Delhi, were
facing elections around October. Having criticized from opposition benches for
the successive governments’ failure to check price increases, BJP wanted to
show that they could deal with it better than its predecessors.
Even while it was grappling with
the general price rise, onion supplies were going out of the market. Onion in
the north Indian cuisine is not just a vegetable: it is an essential ingredient
as masala in cooking (more so in the case of non-vegetarian cuisine). In 1980,
a similar shortage had led to the defeat of the then central government. The
onion shortage had started to attract the maximum protest from the people and
legislators, who were quick to make it their political capital.
Facts had showed that there was
no shortfall in onion cultivation. It was obvious that there was onion hoarding
at suppliers end. I approached the PM with a note that the onion shortage was
becoming a poll issue, and the government was being painted by the opposition
as pro-trader and hence, was not in favour of de-hoarding operations. Although
BJP was controlling the Delhi government, it was not acting against hoarders.
In the meanwhile, the blame game
had broken out between ministries. Instead of the cabinet committee, the full
cabinet meetings were held for dealing with the onion crisis. In a bizarre
step, government banned the export of ‘rose onion’ or sambar onion grown in
south India. This particular onion was not in short supply, and was not a
substitute for its large sized onion cousin. Rose onion is exported mostly
from Tamil Nadu to Singapore and Malaysia which have a sizeable south Indian
population.
After protests from its Tamil
coalition partner in a cabinet meeting, this ban was lifted. There were some
very odd suggestions by senior cabinet ministers for import of white )or salad)
onion from Europe by air cargo. When bureaucrats tried to educate them about
the fact that the continental variety was unsuitable for Indian onion masala as
it was not suffiently pungent, they were snubbed. Suggestions for anti-hoarding
operations even as a symbolic gesture were out of favour.
Information management in such a
medley was a difficult operation. Individual ministers were allowed to air
different views to media on how to deal with the situation. It was forgotten
that unity of purpose is signified by unity of voice. The messengers of bad
news became the targets. First to be replaced was the food and
civil supplies secretary. As government spokesperson, I was dubbed as
ineffective in dealing with media
criticism.
Search for Scapegoats: Adding to the negative perception were other
developments like attacks on minority places of worship and
faith leaders. Suggestions that the center should come out with condemnation
of such attacks did not find favour. Advice
tendered in writing that the new government should initiate steps to allay the
apprehensions of the minorities and announce steps for their economic
inclusiveness were ignored. The party
lost power in Delhi and most of the states where elections were held. And, onions began to flow back into the market
soon after. And the search for
scapegoats, such as the government PR and media relations set up headed by me,
gathered momentum. Rest is history!
