Narendra None-2: Of Onion tears and Scapegoats

By S. Narendra*

The Indian summer season from April to August is always marked by shortages ranging from water and power supply to essential items. Only thing in plentiful supply in such harsh months is heat and sweat. It was no different in the summer of 1998 that had ushered in the BJP - led national democratic alliance (NDA) government at the centre. The political uncertainties following the fall of two Congress party supported governments had also affected the general economic situation. The new government was very much preoccupied with the country’s diplomatic isolation following the nuclear explosion at Pokharn in May.   

Narendra - The author is a
former Spokesperson,  Govt.of India &
information adviser to PM)

Around the month of June, media was reporting sudden shortages of edible oil in some areas; sugar prices were inching up, along with those of vegetables as well. Taking note of such media reports, I met the then finance minister who heads the cabinet committee on prices and requested him to hold an early meeting of this committee and review the situation and announce measures to deal with shortages and the price rise.

Eco-system of Prices and PR:  The cabinet committee on prices has as its members the ministers in charge of Food, Agriculture, Civil Supplies and Commerce. Some other ministers are co-opted as and when required. After reviewing the supply position of essential commodities like edible oil, pulses, wheat, rice, sugar and coarse grains like ragi, bajra and jowar,  the committee decided on improving the supply either by increasing the release of any of the commodities available in  government agencies like the Food Corporation of India or  through import.  

Generally, import of agri-commodities is beset with difficulties because the domestic suppliers oppose it as imports tend to depress prices. The trader lobbies are also not very supportive of imports as they depress prices and profits. Another factor complicating the import option is that supplies may not be available readily. Since it is a spot purchase, unlike a forward deal, the prices tend to be high. Parties in the opposition become another pressure group against imports, and always ready to allege lack of transparency and underhand dealings in imports. The farmers and supplier lobbies of different countries are another factor to deal with. They also use the political and media channels for scuttling each other’s chances. They also freely make use of the brigade of allegation makers. It is not unusual for different departments to take opposing stands for protecting their turfs. For example, the agriculture ministry would like to project itself as the friend of the farmer and would argue that the import price should not exceed the minimum support price that had been offered to the Indian farmers. Some of the states, which grow large quantities of a particular commodity such as wheat, also jump into the fray for protecting their farmer’s interests.

In any information management, preemption is important. Once the price rise panic button is pushed, it feeds on rumour and there could be a run on supplies. Traders tend to hoard, creating further shortages. The convening of the cabinet committee meeting itself could send a signal that there would be a quick government response. In some situations, it could raise unnecessary expectations. Therefore, it is very essential to ensure that the meeting deliberations are carefully released to the media. Serious divergence in the views of the members needs to be briefed openly rather than allowing selective leaks. From a policy management perspective, it is management of politics of shortage and relevant information in public space.

Onion Tears: Back to the summer of 1998. The situation was complicated by the fact that several states in the north, including Delhi, were facing elections around October. Having criticized from opposition benches for the successive governments’ failure to check price increases, BJP wanted to show that they could deal with it better than its predecessors.

Even while it was grappling with the general price rise, onion supplies were going out of the market. Onion in the north Indian cuisine is not just a vegetable: it is an essential ingredient as masala in cooking (more so in the case of non-vegetarian cuisine). In 1980, a similar shortage had led to the defeat of the then central government. The onion shortage had started to attract the maximum protest from the people and legislators, who were quick to make it their political capital.

Facts had showed that there was no shortfall in onion cultivation. It was obvious that there was onion hoarding at suppliers end. I approached the PM with a note that the onion shortage   was becoming a poll issue, and the government was being painted by the opposition as pro-trader and hence, was not in favour of de-hoarding operations. Although BJP was controlling the Delhi government, it was not acting against hoarders.

In the meanwhile, the blame game had broken out between ministries. Instead of the cabinet committee, the full cabinet meetings were held for dealing with the onion crisis. In a bizarre step, government banned the export of ‘rose onion’ or sambar onion grown in south India. This particular onion was not in short supply, and was not a substitute for its large sized   onion cousin. Rose onion is exported mostly from Tamil Nadu to Singapore and Malaysia which have a sizeable south Indian population.

After protests from its Tamil coalition partner in a cabinet meeting, this ban was lifted. There were some very odd suggestions by senior cabinet ministers for import of white )or salad) onion from Europe by air cargo. When bureaucrats tried to educate them about the fact that the continental variety was unsuitable for Indian onion masala as it was not suffiently pungent, they were snubbed. Suggestions for anti-hoarding operations even as a symbolic gesture were out of favour.

Information management in such a medley was a difficult operation. Individual ministers were allowed to air different views to media on how to deal with the situation. It was forgotten that unity of purpose is signified by unity of voice. The messengers of bad news became the targets. First to be replaced was the food   and civil supplies secretary. As government spokesperson, I was dubbed as ineffective in   dealing with media criticism.

Search for Scapegoats: Adding to the negative perception were other developments like   attacks on minority places of worship and faith leaders. Suggestions that   the center should come out with condemnation of such attacks   did not find favour. Advice tendered in writing that the new government should initiate steps to allay the apprehensions of the minorities and announce steps for their economic inclusiveness were ignored.  The party lost power in Delhi and most of the states where elections were held.  And, onions began to flow back into the market soon after.  And the search for scapegoats, such as the government PR and media relations set up headed by me, gathered momentum. Rest is history!